In this paper, the logics of the family I n P k :={I n P k } (n,k)∈ω 2 are formally defined by means of finite matrices, as a simultaneous generalization of the weakly-intuitionistic logic I 1 and of the paraconsistent logic P 1 . It is proved that this family can be naturally ordered, and it is shown an adequate axiomatics for each logic of the form I n P k .
Introduction and preliminaries
The propositional logic P 1 was defined by A. Sette in [11] , within the context of a wide research about Paraconsistent Logic developed in the 70's. It possesses special characteristics that distinguish it from the family {C n } {0≤n≤ω} , the fundamental paraconsistent hierarchy (see [3] ). Among other properties, even when P 1 can be defined by means of a Hilbert-Style axiomatics, it can be also obtained by means of a finite matrix (meanwhile no one of the C n -logics can be characterized in this way). The matrix semantics for P 1 is built taking as basis a set of three truth-values: T 0 and F 0 (intended as the "classical truthvalues") together with T 1 (which can be associated to an "intermediate truth"). Besides that, P 1 is maximal w.r.t to the propositional classical logic (CL), in the sense that, if any axiom-schema (independent of the original ones) is added to the axiomatics of P 1 , then this new axiomatics generates CL. Finally, P 1 is algebraizable, as it was shown in [6] .
As a dual counterpart of this logic, A. Sette and W. Carnielli defined in [12] the logic I 1 , which, in general terms, shares with P 1 several properties among the already mentioned (finite axiomatizability, maximality relative to CL and algebraizability). Besides that, one of the more remarkable differences between I 1 and P 1 is the following: in P 1 is not valid the non-contradiction principle N CP : ¬(¬φ ∧ φ), but it holds the middle excluded principle M EP : ¬φ ∨ φ. On the other hand, I
1 behaves exactly in the opposite way: it verifies N CP and it does not verify M EP .
The logic I
1 is defined by means of a 3-valued matrix, too: in this case (and unlike P 1 ), the "new truth value" is F 1 , an "intermediate truth-value of falsehood". Considering this fact, it was suggested in [12] a generalization of these logics by the addition of new intermediate truth-values, in such a way that the "new logics" already obtained constitute a family (which could be ordered in a natural way). Following (and simplifying at some extent) these suggestions, it was defined in [4] the family I n P k = {I n P k } (n,k)∈ω 2 . Every member of I n P k (usually mentioned here just as an I n P k -logic) can be considered as a generalization of I 1 and of P 1 at the same time, by several reasons. First of all, the classical logic CL can be identified simply with I 0 P 0 . Similarly, P 1 (resp. I 1 ) is simply I 0 P 1 (resp. I 1 P 0 ). Moreover, every I n P k -logic has n + k + 2 truth-values (as it will be seen later). In addition, it can be estabilished an order relation within I n P k . The logics of this family fail to verify N CP and/or M EP (with the obvious exception of I 0 P 0 that satisfies both properties). It is worth to comment that, since the I n P k -logics are finite-valued, and (mostly) paraconsistent/weakly-intuitionistic ones, they can be used as "laboratory logics" in the study of several interesting properties (see [2] or [10] , for example).
However, an open problem referred to this family consists of providing an adequate (i.e. sound and complete) axiomatics for all the I n P k -logics. This paper is essentially devoted to offer a suitable axiomatics for them. Moreover, the soundness and completeness theorems shown here can be considered general in this sense: their proofs are given in such a way that the adequacity of all the logics of I n P k (w.r.t. to the axiomatics here presented) is demonstrated in a structured mode, common to any pair (n, k) ∈ ω 2 previously fixed. The technique to prove this result is adapted to the well-known Kalmár's method to prove completeness for CL (see [8] ).
To avoid unnecesary information or formalism, the notions to be used to prove adequacity will be reduced as much as possible (this entails that this paper will contain some notational abuses). Besides that, the structure of this article is as follows: in the next section the I n P k -logics will be defined by means of finite matrices, some simple properties will be shown here, and it will be defined an order relation in the family I n P k (this justifies the expression "hierarchy" used for this family). In addition, it will be demonstrated that
if and only if (n 2 , k 2 ) ≤ (n 1 , k 1 ). In Section 3, it will presented a general axiomatics for all the I n P k -logics and it will proven some properties, which are essential to the proof of adequacity (result developed in Section 4). For that, it is assumed that the reader is familiarized with the notions of formal proof, schema axioms, inference rules and so on, within the context of Hilbert-Style axiomatics. So, the definitions of these concepts (and other related ones) will be omitted. This paper concludes with some comments about future work.
2 Semantic Presentation of the Hierarchy I n P k To define a matrix semantics for the logics of the family I n P k , it is necessary to start with the definition of the language L(C), common to all the I n P k -logics:
The set of connectives of all the I n P k -logics is C:={¬, →}, with obvious arities. The language L(C) (or set of formulas) for the I n P klogics is the algebra of words generated by C over a countable set V, in the usual way.
Along this paper, the uppercase greek letters Γ, ∆, Σ . . . denote sets of formulas of L(C). In addition, the lowercase greek letters φ, ψ, θ are metavariables ranging over the individual formulas of L(C). Finally, the letters α, α 1 , α 2 , . . . will be used as metavariables referred only to the atomic formulas (that is, the elements of V). All these notations can be used with subscripts, when neccesary. On the other hand, the expression φ[α 1 , . . . , α m ] indicates that the atomic formulas ocurring on φ are precisely α 1 , . . . , α m (this expression will be applied in the developement of the completeness proof).
Despite their common language, the difference between each one of the I n P klogics is given by their respective matrix semantics, defined as follows:
In addition, The operations ¬ and → of C (n,k) (also called truth-functions) 2 are defined by the truth tables indicated below. In addition, every application of ¬ to a "non classical value", approximates more and more the value to the "classical ones", F 0 and T 0 . Note that there are needed n negations at most to pass from F r to F 0 . Similarly, the values of the form T i "become" T 0 after k negations at most. On the other hand, the implication → cannot distinguish between classical or intermediate truth-values: it just considers every value of the form F i as being F 0 , and every value of the form T j as being T 0 .
Taking into account the previous truth-tables, some secondary (and useful) truth-functions can be defined. As a motivation, it would be desirable that disjunction (∨) and conjunction (∧) behave as → in this aspect: they cannot distinguish classical from intermediate truth-values. For that, it is taken as starting point the unary function of "classicalization" c (the meaning of this neologism is obvious), defined by c (A) := (A → A) → A, for every A ∈ A (n,k) . So, the truth-table associated to it is
From c it is defined the truth-function ∼, of strong (also called classical) negation, as ∼ A : = ¬( c A). So, its associated truth-table is
It is possible to define ∨ and ∧ now, adapting the usual definition for CL:
. For these connectives, their associated truth-functions are:
From the previous definitions, it is clear that all the binary truth-functions consider all the non-designated values F j as behaving as F 0 , and similarly for all the values T i . The same fact holds for ∼. In the case of ¬, however, all the truth-values can be differentiated. This is the main difference of ¬ and ∼, and justifies the definition and the study of the I n P k -logics. For example, when n ≥ 1, M EP : ¬φ ∨ φ it is not an I n P k -tautology (it is enough to consider a valuation v such that v(A) = T i with i ≥ 1), meanwhile this principle is valid if ¬ is replaced by ∼. That is, |= (n,k) ∼ φ ∨ φ for any
After a deeper analysis it is possible to see that, given a fixed logic
From these comments can see that N CP and M EP are not valid in general terms. So, it is natural to distinguish between "well-behaved" formulas and "not well-behaved" ones (with respect to each of the mentioned principles). This distinction is formalized with the unary "well-behavior" truth-functions, defined in the obvious way: A * := ¬A∨A; A • := ¬(¬A∧A), for every A ∈ A (n,k) . Its respective truth-tables are
Besides the behavior of the truth-function in each matrix M (n,k) , recall that its definition is motivated by the definition of a consequence relation on L(C) (and therefore of a logic), in the usual way:
(this notion makes sense because L(C) and A (n,k) are similar algebras). Recall here that every M (n,k) -valuation can be defined just considering functions v : V → A (n,k) and extending it to all L(C). The logic I n P k is the pair
(this fact will be denoted by |= (n,k) φ, as usual). The family {I n P k } (n,k)∈ω 2 will be denoted by I n P k .
Remark 2.5 The family I n P k . includes some well-known logics. Indeed, I 0 P 0 is just the classical logic CL. On the other hand, the logic
In addition, all the I n P k -logics can be "naturally ordered", taking into account the following definition: Definition 2.6 The order relation
2 is defined in the following natural way:
Taking into account the previous definition, it is natural to visualize (I n P k , ) as a lattice: Proposition 2.7 In the logic I n P k (n, k fixed), the following formulas are tautologies:
2 ). Therefore, the Hierarchy (I n P k , ) is a lattice.
. There are two cases that must be analyzed in different ways. First, if n 2 > n 1 consider any formula
. So, for both possibilities it holds I n1 P k1 I n2 P k2 . This concludes the proof. ✷ Some consequences of the previous result, useful to visualize (actually, its underlying strict order ≺) are the following:
This section concludes with the mention of the following result that will be applied at the end of this paper:
Proof: Obviously, it is holds a). The claim b) arises from the truth-table of →. With respect to c), |= (n,k) is finitary because is naturally defined by means of a single finite matrix (result indebted to R. Wójcicki: see [13] ). ✷ 3 A Hilbert-Style Axiomatics for the I n P k -logics
From now on, consider an I n P k -logic fixed, with (n, k) ∈ ω 2 . To obtain the desired axiomatics, the secondary truth-functions ∼, c , ∨ and ∧ from the previous section will be reflected by means of the definition of secondary connectives in L(C). Formally:
In addition, the conncectives ∨ CL and ∧ CL are defined by:
Taking into account the previous conventions, the axiomatics for the I n P k -logics will be presented in the sequel. For that consider, from now on, an arbitrary (fixed) pair (n, k) ∈ ω 2 .
is defined by means of the following Hilbert-Style axiomatics, considering these schema axioms:
The only inference rule for this axiomatics is
From this definition, the well-known notions of formal proof (with or without hypotheses), formal theorem, etc. are the usual. Because of this,
This fact will be widely used.
Remark 3.3 It is well known that the inclusion of Ax 1 , Ax 2 and M P entail that it is valid ⊢ (n,k) φ → φ. Moreover:
Proof: This result holds because the inclusion of axioms Ax 1 and Ax 2 too, and considering that the only (primitive) inference rule is Modus Ponens. See [8] for a detailed proof. ✷ Ax 1 and Ax 2 allow to obtain some useful rules in relation to ⊢ (n,k) , too:
Proposition 3.5 Given the logic I n P k , the following secondary rules are valid:
The following two results involve formulas of the form φ * or φ • :
This result is valid since φ * := ∼ (¬φ) → φ and c φ = (φ → φ) → φ, and considering axioms Ax 3 and Ax 4 from Definition 3.2.
Proof: If |= (n,k) φ then (checking the truth-tables of I n P k ) φ is necessarily of the form ¬ q (ψ → θ), with q ≥ 0. From this, apply Ax 3 , Ax 4 (and, eventually, Ax 11 and Ax 12 ). ✷
The next result shows some basic I n P k -theorems:
The following formulas of L(C) are theorems w.r.t. ⊢ (n,k) :
Proof: The following are schematic formal proofs (in the context of ⊢ (n,k) ) for every formula above indicated. Sometimes it will be applied Theorem 3.4 or Proposition 3.5 without explicit mention.
is a particular case of Ax 1 . For the case of a'):
For d): adapt the proof of c), using Ax 8 instead of Ax 7 . Then, it will be valid φ
, MP] From all this, ∼ φ →∼ ψ, ∼ φ → ψ ⊢ (n,k) ψ. Now, apply Theorem 3.4, as in the previous results. This concludes the proof. ✷ Remark 3.9 Now is convenient to relate the axiomatics given in Definition 3.2 with a well-known axiomatics for CL = I 0 P 0 . According [8] , CL can be axiomatized by MP joined with the following three schema axioms:
Note that, cf. Definition 3.2, fixed an arbitrary consequence relation ⊢ (n,k) , the axiom Bx 3 of the previous axiomatics is replaced by a weaker version (Ax 7 ). Anyway, since in the particular case of ⊢ (0,0) , axioms Ax 5 and Ax 6 establish that, for every formula φ ∈ L(C), ⊢ (0,0) φ * and ⊢ (0,0) φ • , it is possible to recover the axiomatics determined by Bx 1 , Bx 2 and Bx 3 , actually. Moreover: Proposition 3.10 Let φ ∈ L(C), in such a way that φ is a formal theorem of CL (that is, ⊢ (0,0) φ), and let φ ′ ∈ L(C), obtained by φ replacing all the ocurrences of the symbol ¬ in φ by ∼. Then ⊢ (n,k) φ ′ .
Proof: Consider the axiomatics for I 0 P 0 indicated in Remark 3.9, and compare it with the general axiomatics given in Definition 3.2. First of all note that neither Bx 1 (= Ax 1 ) nor Bx 2 (= Ax 2 ) have ocurrences of ¬. Besides, since Bx 3 =(¬φ → ¬ψ) → ((¬φ → ψ) → φ)), and considering Prop. 3.8.f), it holds
. From these facts, it can be easily proved by induction of the lenght of the formal proof of φ (w.r.t ⊢ (0,0) ) that ⊢ (0,0) φ implies ⊢ (n,k) φ ′ . ✷ Corollary 3.11 Suppose φ ∈ L(C), and let the formula φ ′′ ∈ L(C) built by φ replacing the eventual ocurrences of ¬ in φ by ∼, and replacing every ocurrence of ∨ CP L (resp. ∧ CP L ), understood as an abbreviation (cf. Definition 3.1), by ∨ (resp. ∧). Then, ⊢ (0,0) φ implies ⊢ (n,k) φ ′′ .
For instance, since ⊢ (0,0) ¬φ ∨ CL φ, then ⊢ (n,k) ∼ φ ∨ φ. However, it is not generally valid that ⊢ (n,k) ¬φ ∨ CL φ, obviously. The next result collects some particular cases of the previous corollary:
Finally, to prove Completeness, it will be necessary: Proposition 3.13 The following are I n P k -theorems:
Proof: these formal theorems are formally demonstrated as in Proposition 3.8, applying DT and Proposition 3.5 if were necessary:
For a): taking into account Corollary 3.12.a'), it is valid
, MP] Thus, it holds φ
• ⊢ (n,k) ¬φ → (φ → ψ), as was desired.
For c):
For h): By Ax 3 and Ax 11 it holds ⊢ (n,k) (¬(φ → ψ)) * ; By Ax 4 and Ax 12 it holds ⊢ (n,k) (¬(φ → ψ))
• .
For i): It is a particular case of h).
For j):
Then, apply Theorem 3.4. This last result completes the proof. ✷
General Soundness and Completeness
It is easy to check that the axioms given in Definition 3.2 are I n P k -tautologies. So, taking into account that MP preserves I n P k -tautologies, it holds:
A theorem of (weak) Completeness arises as an adaptation of the well-known Kalmár's proof for Classical Logic CL, cf. [8] :
p be the set associated to α p and to v, defined by:
On the other hand, for every I n P k -valuation v indicated above, the formula φ v (determined by φ and v) is defined as follows:
•
For the next technical (and essential) result, the following obvious fact will be applied without explicit mention: according to the previous definition, if φ ∈ L(C) and ψ is a subformula of φ then, for every valuation v, ∆ 
Proof: By induction on the complexity of φ. The analysis is divided in the following cases:
. The proof of Case 1) is completed.
Case 2): when φ is of the form ¬ψ. Consider the following subcases:
• (⋆). Indeed, if this fact holds, from Ax 10 , then it would be verified ∆ 
• (⋆⋆) (such a proof runs as follows, according the internal structure of ψ):
Consider the following possibilities for v(α): by similar reasons to 3.1.3.2) ). In addition, (
• , from Def. 4.2. Now note that Ax 12 can be applied in all the subcases 3.1.2.1)-3.1.2.4), in such a way to obtain ∆ v ψ ⊢ (n,k) ψ
• , completing the proof (⋆⋆) for Subcase 3.1.2).
• . Now, apply Ax 12 , q times. So, it was proven (⋆⋆) for all the possibilities of Subcase 3.1. From this, (⋆) and Prop. 3.
• (because Ax 3 and Prop. 3.6, resp.), it is valid that ∆ φ ⊢ (n,k) ¬(θ * ) → ¬(ψ → θ), by Prop. 3.8.d). In addition, reasoning as in Subcase 3.2) (w.r.t θ),
v . The analysis of this last subcase finishes the proof. ✷ Lemma 4.4 Let ∆ ∪ {ψ, θ} be a subset of L(C). If the following n + k + 4 syntactic consequences are valid:
Proof: First, by Hypothesis 1) to n) can be obtained ∆, 
. Hence, from ( †) and ( † †) and Corollary 3.12.d):
. On the other hand, it holds ⊢ (n,k) (¬θ) * , because Hyp. n+k+3) and Ax 11 . And, of course,
Thus (by Hyp. n+k+3) and Ax 9 ), ∆, ¬(ψ * ), . . . , ¬((¬ n−2 ψ) * ) ⊢ (n,k) θ (✸✸). The procedure used above to prove (✸✸) can be applied using (in decreasing order) the Hypotheses 1) ... n − 1), proving (⋆) (note that the formula ¬(ψ * ) cannot be "suppressed" yet). From (⋆) (and monotonicity), ∆, ∼ ψ ⊢ ¬(ψ * ) → θ. Moreover, from Hyp. n + k + 1), it holds ∆, ∼ ψ ⊢ ψ * → θ. From these facts and Corollary 3.12.c),
On the other hand, from n + 1) to n + k) it is valid ∆, ψ ∧ ¬ψ ⊢ (n,k) θ (⋆⋆). The reasoning is as follows: using n + k) and Ax 6 , it holds:
. Hence, by Corollary 3.12.c) and recalling Definition 3.1:
* , by Definition 3.1, Ax 3 and Ax 11 . From these two facts, it holds ∆, . . . ,
Adapting the reasoning applied in (✸✸✸) to the Hypotheses n+k−2), . . . , n+1) (in a decreasing order, as before), it is obtained (⋆⋆), as desired. From (⋆⋆) and monotonicity it is valid ∆, c ψ ⊢ (n,k) ¬ψ ∧ ψ → θ. So (by Hyp. n+k+4), Prop. 3.6, Ax 11 and Prop. 3.8.d)), ∆, c ψ ⊢ (n,k) ¬θ → ψ
• . On the other hand, by Hyp. 
• → ¬¬θ. Hence, ∆, c ψ ⊢ (n,k) ¬¬θ, because Prop. 3.13.c). Now, taking into account Hyp. n+k+3) and Ax 9 , it is valid ∆, c ψ ⊢ (n,k) θ. (II). From (I), (II) and Corollary 3.12.c), is verified ∆ ⊢ (n,k) ( c ψ) * → θ. Hence, it is valid ∆ ⊢ (n,k) θ, by Prop 3.6. ✷ Thus, using Lemmas 4.3 and 4.4 it is possible to demonstrate (weak) completeness as the following result shows:
Proof: Suppose |= (n,k) φ, with φ = φ[α 1 , . . . , α m ], and consider the set V AL φ := {v t } 1≤t≤(n+k+2) m (the set of all the I n P k -valuations effectively used to evaluate φ). Define in V AL φ the equivalence relation ≡ 1 , as follows: for every
This relation has (n + k + 2) m−1 equivalence classes (indicated, in a general way, by ||v||). Besides that, taking into account Definition 4.2, it holds that (given a fixed equivalence class ||v||) Q V AL φ are needed to obtain the formal proofs that allow to demonstrate ⊢ (n,k) φ.
Theorems 4.1 and 4.5 prove weak adequacity: |= (n,k) φ iff ⊢ (n,k) φ. This result can be improved:
Theorem 4.6 [Strong Adequacity]: for every Γ ∪ {φ} ⊆ L(C), Γ |= (n,k) φ iff Γ ⊢ (n,k) φ.
Proof: By Proposition 2.10, |= (n,k) verifies Semantics Deduction Theorem and is finitary. Moreover, by the definition of formal proof used in this paper, ⊢ (n,k) is finitary, and (by Theorem 3.4) it verifies Sintactic Deduction Theorem, as was already mentioned. From all this facts, and taking into account that both |= (n,k) and ⊢ (n,k) are monotonic, strong adequacity is demonstrated. ✷
Concluding remarks
Despite its interest as a general result (for a countable, non-lineal family of logics), the adequate axiomatics shown here can be applied in different ways.
First of all, a natural problem to be solved is the independence of the axiomatics presented here and it is part of a future work.
On the other hand, another of the possible uses of this axiomatics is the study of algebraizability of the I n P k -logics. It is worth to comment here that I 1 P 0 is algebraizable (see [12] ), as in the case of I 0 P 1 (this fact was already indicated). Moreover, in [5] it was demonstrated that all the logics of I n P k are algebraizable. So, the properties of the class of algebras associated to each I n P k -logic deserve to be investigated. By the way, the class of algebras associated to I 0 P 1 was already studied in [7] and in [9] . In both works, the axiomatics obtained for this logic are very useful for the study of the so-called class of P 1 -algebras. This is because there is a connection between the axiomatics of an algebraizable logic and its equivalent algebraic semantics, cf. [1] . As a generalization of this fact, the axiomatics shown here would allow to study the different classes of (say) I n P k -algebras in a more efficient way.
Finally, note this fact about the complexity of the formulas: given a fixed logic I n P k , every formula φ ∈ L(C) with complexity Comp(φ) ≥ max{n, k} behaves "in a classical way" (this fact is related to the inclusion of Ax 5 and Ax 6 in the axiomatics presented in this paper). This would suggest to define a special kind of logics: the family SC of "stationary classically logics". Obviously, I
n P k would be a particular subclass of SC. The study of the latter class deserves special attention in a future research.
